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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the political characteristics of the Malaysian government and the state governments’ fiscal 
behavior. In particular, we seek to analyze whether the incentives for the state governments to observe a prudent spending behavior have 
not been undermined by the fact that they have been able to influence relevant central government decisions regarding their finance. Our 
estimations results show that states that are overrepresented at the executive level tend to have higher spending and deficits. However, we 
don’t find any correlation between overrepresentation at the Parliament and states governments’ fiscal outcomes. This can be explained 
by the fact that in Malaysia as is frequently the case in developing nations, the legislature is peripheral to the executive in terms of 
decision making power. The results also show that ideological belonging does not have any impact on the state governments’ level of
expenditures and deficits. We do not find any significant correlation between the level of support obtained by the ruling party in state 
elections and the level of the state governments’ expenditures and deficits.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 
Organising Committee of ICOAE 2012
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1. Introduction.
The first generation of economic theories of fiscal federalism generated much optimism about 
decentralization in the form of better improvements in efficiency, accountability and governance. However, 
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these theories seemed to be increasingly anachronistic in the face of subnational debt accumulation and 
bailouts as well as evidence of corruption and inefficiency associated with decentralization. As a result a new 
wave of scholarship where political variables are given center stage has emerged whose major assumption is 
that politicians are primarily interested in maintaining and enhancing their political careers (Belleflamme and 
Hindriks, 2003; Besley and Coate, 2003; Hindriks and Lockwood, 2005). In these models, government 
decisions are viewed as bargains struck among self-interested politicians attempting to form winning 
coalitions rather than reflections on the optimal provision of collective goods or the internalization of 
externalities. Consequently, central government is no longer autonomously able to alter subnational policies 
as it will have to bargain with subnational governments in order to gain support from all or at least some 
minimum fraction of them. This paper attempts to shed light on the political economy of the Malaysian state 
governments’ budgetary behavior by tailoring hypotheses drawn from recent theory literature to the 
Malaysian institutional context and testing them empirically. Our main objective here is to examine whether 
state governments’ fiscal behavior can partly be explained by the political attributes and the institutional 
characteristics of the government and of the legislature. In particular, we will try to analyze whether the 
incentives for the state governments to observe a prudent spending behavior have not been undermined due to 
the fact that they have been able to influence relevant central government decisions regarding their finance. 
There are basically two hypotheses that we attempt to test in this paper: Do states with the most votes (or the 
strongest representation) in the Parliament or in the government have relatively a higher spending and run a 
larger deficit? And do states that share the same ideological leaning as the central government have relatively 
a higher spending and run a larger deficit? The reason being a highly influential state in the sense that they are 
highly represented in the government or share the same political ideology as the central government, face 
weaker incentives to be fiscally responsible as it has higher probability of obtaining extra allocations from the 
central government and in case of a crisis, is more likely to be rescued. 
The paper will be organized as follows. In the next section, a brief review of the literature is provided. Section 
three discusses the econometric approach that will be adopted. The results of our estimations will be presented 
and discussed in section four.  Finally section five concludes.
2. A review of literature.
Empirically, Wright (1974) provided some of the first indications that political factors were significant in 
determining the allocation of New Deal expenditures across states in the United States. In particular, he found 
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that his political variables did a much better job of explaining the patterns of expenditure across states than his 
economic variables. In particular, he found a strong positive correlation between New Deal spending per 
capita and electoral votes per capita across states.  Baqir (1999) shows that the Law generally holds true in 
American city councils. He also finds that the effect is weaker in city councils containing at-large members 
(from proportional representation districts), suggesting that single member districts are crucial for the 
operation of the law. Dixit and Londregan (1998) provided another rationale for intergovernmental transfers. 
According to them, transfers are made to politically powerful groups (or regions) containing swing voters. 
Inman (1988) finds little evidence that intergovernmental grants are used to alleviate externalities. Rather, he 
finds the growing decentralization of decision procedures in the US Congress explains the increase in the use 
of grants. Peterson (1995) finds that representational arguments can explain the level of grants received by 
states: more money goes to rural and sparsely populated states that are overrepresented in Congress, and to 
states that have legislators on key Congressional committees. Bradbury and Crain (2001) found that 
government consumption is directly related to the size of the legislature. Nevertheless, when an upper 
chamber exists, they find that the effect of the Law is mitigated by the number of seats in that chamber. 
Studies have also been conducted in other national settings than the United States. Pitlik et al (2005) analyze 
the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany’s intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. 
They found that malapportionment in the upper house of the German legislative leads to disproportional state 
shares of per capita transfers. In an empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 
1999, Rodden (2002) shows that there is a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita 
during each period. Other things equal, the study shows that small member states with more votes and
relative voting power per capita are favored in the distribution of transfers.
3. Data Specification and Empirical Strategy.
3.1. Data specification.
Our study covers the period of 1980-2003. The data on state governments’ expenditures and revenues are 
obtained from the Yearly Financial Statement of the state governments which are published and made public 
every year by the State Finance/Treasury Office. We combined the data with political, socio-demographic as 
well as economic data from other sources. The political data are mainly obtained from the Election Report 
prepared by the Election Commission. The data on election results are also obtained from the major 
newspaper of the country. State demographic and economic characteristics are mainly obtained from the State 
and District Report published by the Statistics Department.
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3.2. Empirical strategy.
The two hypotheses that we want to test may be summarized as follows
H1: States with the most votes (or the strongest representation) in the Parliament or in the government have 
relatively a higher spending and run a larger deficit (the legislative bargaining model).
H2: States that share the same ideological leaning as the central government have relatively a higher 
spending and run a larger deficit (the partisanship model).
Our empirical specification will thus be as follows
Spendingi,t =D.Politicsit + EXit + fi + nt + eit
Deficitit = O.Politicsit + GXit + fi + nt +  wit
where Spendingit and Deficitit are log of real per capita expenditure and real per capita deficit respectively. 
Our variable of interest is Politicsit which represents various political institutions susceptible of influencing 
the state government’s spending and deficit level namely the number of seats allocated to each states in the 
parliament per capita, the number of seats won by the ruling party per capita in the parliament and the number 
of members in the cabinet per capita (for our first hypothesis) and the number of votes obtained by the ruling 
party and the percentage of state assembly seats won by the opposition (for our second hypothesis). eit and wit
represent the disturbance terms of our model whereas fi and nt represent the individual and temporal effects 
respectively.
The vector Xit represents various control variables which we believe are determinant in explaining the fiscal 
behavior of state governments in Malaysia. These control variables include lagged value of the dependant 
variable, log of real per capita revenue (for equation 1), dummy variable representing year before election was 
held, log of total population, gdp per capita, a dummy variable for states with petrol revenues, proportion of 
forest area, proportion of “bumiputera” of the total population, urbanization rate, and proportion of population 
with tertiary education. 
The income variable is a proxy for Wagner’s Law according to which an increase in income will leads to an 
increase in spending. The possible inertia and dynamic process underlying the dependant variables is taken 
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into consideration by including their lagged values. Besides lagged expenditures/deficits may be correlated 
both with current expenditures/deficits and the political outcomes – the level of current expenditures/deficits 
may partly be the result of last period electoral and fiscal outcomes - and hence can be used to test the 
robustness of the political effect. The timing of state elections could be correlated both with state fiscal 
outcomes and with the political indicator, and we therefore also include a specification that controls for the 
state election cycle.
A dummy variable for states with petrol revenues and the proportion of forest area are included in order to 
control for differences in the states’ natural endowments which greatly determine the differences in revenues 
between states. In effect, revenues from land, forest and mines represent the States’ main sources of revenues 
and since the States are not similarly endowed with these, some of them end up by having more revenues than 
others. In order to control for the needs and the expectations of the population in term of provision of local 
public goods, we includes in our estimation the urbanization rate as well as the proportion of population with 
tertiary education. The proportion of “bumiputera” (the malays and the natives of the country) is included as 
the muslim and native laws and customs fall under the responsibilities of the state government and the 
proportion of bumiputera of the total population varies across states (from more than 95% in states like 
Kelantan and Trengganu to less than 50% in states such as Penang). States with a higher proportion of 
bumiputera in their population will thus incur a higher amount of spending than those with a lower proportion 
of bumiputera.
As discussed above, we include in our model the lagged values of our dependant variables. Consequently, we 
can no longer use the usual fixed-effect model since the estimators will not be convergent as the lagged value 
is correlated with the error term. The potential bias is function of 1/T and the intra-individual estimator is 
convergent only in the case where T is big. Given the weak temporal dimension of our sample, the bias is 
potentially big. Besides past spending decisions may influence the current political variables as well as having 
some influence on current spending decisions, if spending patterns are trending through time. Consequently, 
we will apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
method will not only help solve the problem of serially correlated error term but also those of endogeneity. 
5. Empirical results.
Table 1 summarizes the results of our estimations. We began by estimating the effect of overrepresentation at 
the parliament on the state governments’ expenditure level. For that we used two different variables namely 
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the number of seats per capita and the number of seats won by the ruling party per capita. The results are 
shown in column A and B. As we can see from the table, when we choose the number of seats per capita as 
our primary independent variable, the impact of overrepresentation at the parliament level on the expenditure 
level is negative and not statistically significant. A higher number of representatives per capita at the 
legislature will not translate into a higher spending by the state governments. When we use the number of 
seats in the Parliament controlled by the ruling coalition as the independent variable, the impact of 
overrepresentation has turned positive. However, the coefficient is still statistically non significant.  
In column (C), we include the number of member in the cabinet per capita in our estimation. As we have 
shown in our discussion of the political environment in Malaysia, backbenchers do not have much power in 
the legislature as most if not all bills are initiated by the members of the executive. Furthermore, any bills that 
are tabled in the Parliament will necessarily be adopted and promulgated by the Parliament. As a result, states 
have much more to gain from federal policies when they are well or overrepresented in the executives. 
Besides, ministers also have the power of directing porks to their constituents without necessarily having to 
pass through to the Parliament. Our expectation is validated by our estimation result as it shows that the 
coefficient for cabinet member per capita is highly significant. This estimate indicates that a higher 
representation in the executive leads to a higher spending by state governments. We remark that the 
coefficient for seats of parliament per capita is still statistically insignificant. This may confirm the fact that 
there are relatively few powers that are in the hand of backbenchers.
Table 1: The effects of political factors on state governments’ expenditures.
A B C D
Political vrbls
No of seats per capita -0.0029   
(0.0085)
-0.0025   
(0.0075)
-0.0046   
(0.0085)
No of seats controlled by BN 
pc
0.0026  
(0.0038)
No of member of cabinet pc 0.0022**   
(0.0008)
0.0017*   
(0.0009)
Votes obt by BN at states -0.0007   
(0.0009)
-0.0012   
(0.0010)
-0.0008  
(0.0009)
States seats won by BN 0.0002   
(0.0004)
Year bef elec 0.0569**   
(0.0208)
0.0578**   
(0.0206)
0.0581**   
(0.0205)
0.0568**   
(0.0206)
Economic vrbls
Revenue 0.4374***   
(0.0793)
0.4391***    
(0.0776)
0.4499***   
(0.0787)
0.4450***   
(0.0765)
Lagged exp 0.4916***    0.4906***   0.4813***   0.4805***   
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(0.0643) (0.0646) (0.0592) (0.0596)
GDP -0.00004   
(0.0002)
0.00003   
(0.00032)
0.00005   
(0.00025)
0.0002   
(0.0002)
Petrolstate 0.0429   
(0.0509)
0.0502   
(0.0572)
0.0431  
(0.0467)
0.0636   
(0.0503)
Sociodemo vrbls
Population -0.0443   
(0.0262)
-0.0306   
(0.01910
-0.0019   
(0.0246)
-0.0154    
(0.0241)
Malay prop 0.0002   
(0.0010)
0.0002   
(0.0009)
0.0006   
(0.0011)
0.0015  
(0.0009)
Urban rate 0.0022   
(0.0015)
0.0020    
(0.0015)
0.0015   
(0.0011)
0.0021  
(0.0010)
Tertiary education -0.0032   
(0.0055)
-0.0016   
(0.0044)
-0.0031   
(0.0035)
-0.0048   
(0.0037)
Forest Area 8.61e-07   
(1.01e-06)
2.92e-07   
(6.39e-07)
5.12e-07   
(8.47e-07)
2.62e-07   
(8.58e-07)
Constant 0.6333*   
(0.3548)
0.5133*   
(0.2100)
0.3126   (0.3886) 0.3364   (0.4081)
Sargan p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2nd order AC (prob) -0.61(0.544) -0.59(0.553) -0.62(0.535) -0.66 (0.511)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% 
level***.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient for year before election is highly statistically significant. This 
signifies that public expenditures have been used by the state governments in order to get more votes during 
election. The revenue of the state governments and the lagged values of expenditures level are also positively 
and significantly correlated with the state governments’ expenditures level.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results when we use as our dependant variable the deficit level of the state 
government instead of the expenditure level. We did the same number of estimations as we did before and we 
found practically the same results as in our previous estimation. Again, the results indicate that 
overrepresentation at the executive is positively correlated with the state governments’ deficit level. States 
that are highly represented in the cabinet will have higher deficits. Our results also show that there is no 
significant correlation between the number of representative per capita at the Parliament with the state 
governments’ deficit level.  
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As to the question whether states governments spend more when they share the same ideological belongings 
as the federal governments, we test for this by including in our estimations the variable representing the 
percentage of votes obtained by the ruling coalition and the one representing the percentage of State 
Assembly seats won by the opposition. In all estimations, the results show that there is no statistically 
significant relation between these variables and the level of expenditures of the state governments (only 
results for estimations using the percentage of votes obtained by the ruling party are shown in table 4 and 5). 
This signifies that state government fiscal outcomes are not dependant on whether their population voted 
heavily for the ruling coalition or not. 
Table 2: The effects of political factors on state governments’ deficits level.
A B C D
Political vrbls
No of seats per capita -1.91085   
(4.7506)    
-0.6688   
(2.6231)    
2.7661   
(2.9721)     
No of seats controlled by BN pc -3.3409  
(3.2484)    
No of member of cabinet pc 1.0538*   
(0.5233)     
1.1524*   
(0.5354)     
Votes obtained by BN at states 
election
0.2340  
(1.0798)    
0.6452   
(1.3534)     
0.4927   
(0.8147)     
States seats won by BN -0.2079   
(0.2095)    
Year bef elec 16.6586*   (8.3227)     16.5988*  
(8.5802)     
19.6134**   (9.0257)     19.0664**    (8.3369)    
Economic vrbls
Real expenditures pc 66.6795**   
(25.1188)     
65.2785**   
(24.2230)     
50.7101**  (20.3208) 52.8096**   (19.6088)    
Lagged deficit 0.0562   
(0.1501)     
0.0464   
(0.1656)     
0.0818   
(0.1405)     
0.0559   
(0.1271)     
GDP -0.0611   
(0.1920)    
-0.0687   
(0.2089)    
-0.0021   
(0.0721)    
0.1011   
(0.1210)     
Petrol state -62.6083*   
(28.3832)    
-60.4690**   
(25.8421)    
-37.7444*   (18.4470)    -43.1678*   (21.3839)    
Sociodemo vrbls
Population -9.2962  
(22.2034)    
-15.9087   (16.6794)    23.4203**   (10.4760)    22.0036   
(8.7602)     
Malay prop 0.1798  
(0.6850)     
0.1578  
(0.5751)     
0.3539   
(0.1946)     
0.4673   
(0.3862)         
Urban rate -2.0024*   
(1.0958)    
-1.8137   
(1.1190)    
-0.5414*   
(0.4520)    
-1.3258*  
(0.6221)    
Tertiary education 5.4941   
(3.8728)     
5.2102     
(4.0244)     
2.0484   
(1.3618)     
2.7082   
(2.1131)     
Forest area -0.0007  
(0.0007)    
-0.0006   
(0.0005)    
-0.0013**  
(0.0005)    
-0.0012**    (0.0005)    
Constant -217.5752   
(306.5637)    
-184.2431   
(191.7928)    
-465.9768*    
(233.7870)
-447.632**   
(173.6959)    
Sargan p-value 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
2nd order AC (prob) 0.81(0.421) 0.77(0.443) -0.84(0.404) -0.79(0.428)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, significant at 1% level***.
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6. Conclusion.
The main objective in this paper is to examine whether state governments’ fiscal behavior in Malaysia can be 
explained by political and institutional factors. More precisely, we try to analyze whether states governments 
that are highly represented at the legislative and the executive are more likely to have higher expenditures. We 
also try to analyze the effects of partisanship on the state governments’ expenditures.
Our estimations results show that states that are overrepresented at the executive level tend to have higher 
spending and deficits. However, we don’t find any correlation between overrepresentation at the Parliament 
and states governments’ fiscal outcomes. This can be explained by the fact that in Malaysia as is frequently 
the case in developing nations, the legislature is peripheral to the executive in terms of decision making 
power. Indeed, not only that the cabinet members initiated all of the bills tabled in the Parliament, they 
usually have no problem in pushing through their proposals. The results also show that ideological belonging 
does not have any impact on the state governments’ level of expenditures and deficits. We do not find any 
significant correlation between the level of support win by the ruling party in state elections and the level of 
the state governments’ expenditures and deficits. However, these results cannot be interpreted as a proof that 
no states have been victimized because of their support for the opposition since anecdotal evidences clearly 
show to the contrary. Rather, we believe that since in our period of study the practice of discrimination have 
been limited to at most two states at a time, it may not be significant enough to be captured by our empirical 
analysis.
The policy implication of this study is that any formal rules that may be introduced by the government in 
order to regulate fiscal relations in federations will not have a substantial impact on subnational governments’ 
fiscal outcomes if political incentives allow and encourage circumventing these rules. One potential avenue of 
future investigation is to further explore the role of political institutions and electoral rules. This may provide 
insight into whether these institutions can be changed to provide better incentives for fiscal prudence, or how 
other institutional rules can be designed to be impervious to political manipulations. 
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